Longevity, life-cycle behavior and pension reform by Haan, Peter & Prowse, Victoria
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Longevity, life-cycle behavior and
pension reform
Peter Haan and Victoria Prowse
Cornell University, Department of Economics, DIW Berlin - German
Institute for Economic Research
6 June 2012
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/39282/
MPRA Paper No. 39282, posted 6 June 2012 15:36 UTC
Longevity, Life-cycle Behavior and Pension Reform
Peter Haan, Victoria Prowsey
June 6, 2012
Abstract
How can public pension systems be reformed to ensure scal stability in the face of in-
creasing life expectancy? To address this pressing open question in public nance, we use
micro data to estimate a structural life-cycle model of individuals' employment, retirement
and consumption decisions. Our modeling approach allows life expectancy and the nature of
the public pension system to inuence the decisions of forward-looking individuals planning
for retirement. We calculate that, in the case of Germany, an increase of 4.34 years in the
full pensionable age or a cut of 37.7% in the per-year value of public pension benets would
oset the scal consequences of the 6.4 year increase in age 65 life expectancy anticipated
to occur over the next 40 years. Of these two approaches to coping with the scal impact
of improving longevity, increasing the full pensionable age generates the largest responses in
labor supply and retirement behavior.
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1 Introduction
Over the last several decades the longevity of individuals living in the developed world has im-
proved considerably and consistently, and this trend looks set to continue.1 Such a demographic
change poses numerous social and economic challenges. Notably, many public pension systems,
which are typically compulsory dened benet schemes, are being strained by the greater pen-
sion demands concurrent higher life expectancy. In response to this problem, an important
political debate has arisen concerning how to reform public pension systems to address the s-
cal demands created by improving longevity. This debate has focused on identifying eective
ways of increasing the age-based eligibility requirements associated with public pension benets.
The policy response thus far has reected this theme: for example, Germany and the US have
recently announced plans to gradually increase the full pensionable age, that is the age from
which an individual may claim a non-reduced public pension, from 65 to 67 years.
We use a comprehensive dynamic structural model to understand the relationship between
life expectancy, the public pension system and individuals' employment, retirement and con-
sumption decisions over the life-cycle. We use the Method of Simulated Moments to estimate
the model's parameters. Drawing on this framework, we are the rst to analyze how changes in
life expectancy aect optimal individual employment, retirement and consumption through the
life-cycle. By looking at how individuals respond to changes in individual and cohort-specic
longevity, we break new ground by exploring the desirability of changes in the public pension
system designed to cope with the scal challenges posed by increasing life expectancy. This
paper therefore makes a novel contribution to the policy debate on how public pension systems
can be reformed to deal eectively with the consequences for Government nances of increasing
life expectancy.
Our structural life-cycle model includes stochastic job oers, involuntary separations, saving
opportunities and borrowing constraints, early retirement possibilities, unobserved heterogene-
ity in preferences, employment opportunities and wages, and detailed specications of the tax
and transfer systems. Moreover, the modeling approach naturally allows life expectancy and
the public pension system to inuence the decisions of forward-looking individuals planning
for retirement. This methodology is ideally suited to quantifying the eect of life expectancy
on behavior and to exploring the consequences of reductions in public pension generosity. By
considering the interplay between life expectancy and public pension reform when individuals
may adjust employment, retirement and consumption behavior, we expand on previous ap-
plications of structural life-cycle models. In particular, our paper builds on several previous
structural studies which have used life-cycle models to investigate the eects of public pension
systems on labor supply, retirement and consumption decisions (e.g., Casanova, 2010, French,
2005, French and Jones, 2011, Gustman and Steinmeier, 1986, Gustman and Steinmeier, 2005,
Heyma, 2004, Jimenez-Martn and Sanchez Martn, 2007, Rust and Phelan, 1997, and van der
Klaauw and Wolpin, 2008) and on work that developed structural life-cycle models in which in-
dividuals choose jointly consumption and labor supply (e.g., Imai and Keane, 2004, and Keane
1E.g., Oeppen and Vaupel (2002) show that over the last 150 years life expectancy at birth in the developed
world has been increasing at a rate of 2.5 years per decade, and argue that this linear trend is likely to continue.
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and Wolpin, 2001).2 Our paper is also related to a small literature that looks at the eect of
life expectancy on the saving decision alone (see Brown, 2001, De Nardi et al., 2010, Gan et al.,
2004, and Hurd, 1989).
We implement our model in the context of Germany, a country with a compulsory pay-as-
you-go dened benet public pension system which displays many similarities to Social Security
in the United States. Couching the analysis in the context of Germany allows us to exploit a
unique pattern of variation in the evolution of demographic group-specic life expectancy which
arose due to events that followed German reunication in 1990. Specically, drawing on variation
between demographic groups in the extent of improvements in life expectancy, we demonstrate
that the estimated model predicts the observed relationship between life expectancy and retire-
ment. This suggests that our model provides a sound basis for counterfactual policy simulations
which explore the eect of life expectancy on employment, retirement and consumption behavior.
In terms of data sources, we obtain projections of age-specic life expectancies by cohort,
region and gender from the Human Mortality Database for Germany. Data on life expectancy are
combined with a sample of older individuals taken from the German Socio-Economic Panel and
covering the years 1991 - 2007. In addition to replicating the observed relationship between life
expectancy and retirement behavior as discussed above, the tted model is able to reproduce the
distribution of observed wages, the age prole of wealth and the age-specic rates of transitions
between employment and unemployment.
The leading results of counterfactual simulations based on the estimated structural life-cycle
model are twofold. First, in response to an increase in life expectancy we nd that individuals
work more and postpone retirement, and thereby increase public pension benets for their now
longer retirement periods. Reecting this behavioral adjustment, an increase in life expectancy
leads to higher net Government revenues received from individuals aged below the full pension-
able age; however, the increase in net revenue from individuals aged below the full pensionable
age is dwarfed by the increase in public pension demands. Qualitatively, the 6.4 year increase in
age 65 life expectancy anticipated to occur over the next 40 years leads average net Government
revenue per person, summed over the life-cycle starting at age 40 years and continuing until
death, to decrease by approximately 75000 Euros.
Second, we demonstrate striking dierences between behavioral responses to two revenue
equivalent reductions in public pension generosity. We calculate that the scal consequences
of the 6.4 year increase in age 65 life expectancy anticipated to occur over the next 40 years
can be oset by either an increase of 4.34 years in the full pensionable age or a cut of 37.7% in
the per-year value of public pension benets. We nd that the increase in the full pensionable
age elicits a marked increase in the employment rate, while a revenue equivalent the cut in the
per-year value of public pension benets has little impact on employment outcomes. Intuitively,
the increase in the employment rate associated with the increase in the full pensionable age
arises because the age-based eligibility rules embedded in the public pension system represent
binding constraints on access to public pension benets for many individuals. Meanwhile, those
2A largely separate literature presents empirical evidence from micro data of a direct eect of pension rights
on retirement decisions (e.g., Blau, 1994, Blundell et al., 2002, Disney and Smith, 2002, French and Jones,
forthcoming, Friedberg, 2000, and Friedberg and Webb, 2005). Blondal and Scarpetta (1997) and Gruber and
Wise (1998) demonstrate a similar relationship at the macro level. Gruber and Wise (2004) and Gruber and Wise
(2007) survey the micro and macro evidence.
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individuals most aected by a cut in the per-year value of public pension benets are likely to
be in employment and ineligible for early retirement, and hence are generally unable to increase
employment. We compute that expected total per-person post age 40 years consumption is
over 100000 Euros higher if the scal consequences for the Government of 40 years worth of
improvements in longevity are counteracted by an increase in the full pensionable age rather
than a revenue equivalent cut in the per-year value of pension benets.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 outlines our life-cycle model. Section 3 describes
our data sources. Section 4 provides an overview the estimation methodology, presents our
structural parameter estimates and demonstrates the model's goodness of t. Section 5 discusses
the results of counterfactual policy simulations. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 Model
2.1 Overview
To examine the impact of life expectancy on life-cycle behavior and to explore the eectiveness
of public pension reforms, we develop a rich dynamic structural model of individual's employ-
ment, retirement and consumption decisions over the life-cycle. We propose a discrete-time
nite-horizon model. Each quarter, i.e., every three months, an individual chooses his or her
current labor market state and current consumption.3 We distinguish three labor market states:
full-time work (f); unemployment (u); and retirement (r).4 Retirement is an absorbing state.
Individuals are indexed by i = 1; :::; N , and age, measured in quarters of a year, is indexed by
t.5 The maximum possible age to which an individual can live is denoted by T . We follow the
life tables and use T = 110 years. We focus on the employment, retirement and consumption
behavior of individuals aged 40-65 years. Following De Nardi et al. (2010), in the interest of
ensuring that our empirical analysis captures precisely the relevant institutional and environ-
mental factors we study only those individuals who reside in single-adult households and who
do not have dependent children.6
Each period, an individual enjoys a ow of utility which depends on current consumption,
ci;t, current leisure and individual-specic preference shifters. We use Ui;t(ci;t; j) for j = f; u; r
to denote individual i's age t ow utility from state j. Following Low et al. (2010), we adopt
3Quarterly decision making allows accurate modeling of the Unemployment Insurance system.
4Full-time work is 39 hours of work per week. This is the median hours of work of sampled individuals.
5To improve readability we do not introduce further subscripts to index specic cohorts or years: cohort
information is specic to the individual, and together with age information, the year is thereby dened.
6Older non-retired individuals constitute the demographic group for which we expect that behavior is most
sensitive to life expectancy and the design of the pension system. Indeed, previous work has shown that the labor
supply and retirement decisions of older, yet working age, individuals are relatively elastic with respect to income
(e.g., Gruber and Wise, 2004, Haveman et al., 1991, and Lalive et al., 2006). Hence, there should be little loss
restricting the analysis to older individuals. Single-adult households constitutes around 30% of all households in
which the household head is aged 40-65 years. The public pension system is administered at the individual level
and therefore our results for singles are indicative of the behavior of other demographic groups.
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the following constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) specication for preferences:
Ui;t(ci;t; f) = 
(ci;t(1  i))1 
1   + "i;f;t; (1)
Ui;t(ci;t; j) = 
c1 i;t
1   + "i;j;t for j = u; r: (2)
In equations (1) and (2),  is the coecient of relative risk aversion, and i describes the comple-
mentarity between consumption and leisure. We impose i 2 [0; 1), and this has two implications.
First, we can interpret i as the share of consumption necessary to compensate individual i for
the disutility of working. Second, consumption and leisure are Frisch complements, meaning
that, ceteris paribus, the marginal utility of consumption is higher for working individuals than
for either unemployed individuals or retired individuals. We allow unobserved heterogeneity
in the complementarity between leisure and consumption by assuming that iji  N(; 2),
where i denotes the individual's observed characteristics at the time of labor market entry.
7
The unobservables "i;f;t, "i;u;t and "i;r;t represent transient individual-specic preference shifters
while the parameter  determines the importance of consumption and leisure in preferences,
relative to the transient individual-specic unobservables.8;9
Current consumption is the sum of current net income and current dissaving. Current
net income depends on the individual's gross incomes from employment and from interest on
wealth, and on the contemporaneous tax, transfer and pension systems. Our model includes an
accurate representation of the tax system, including income tax deductions and Social Security
Contributions. The model also includes the two leading forms of out-of-work transfers: Social
Assistance; and Unemployment Insurance. Appendix E provides further information about the
tax and transfer systems. Further details about the modeling of the pension system can be
found in Section 2.4.10
7To guarantee that i 2 [0; 1) we truncate i from above at 0.999 and from below at zero. According to this
specication, preference heterogeneity occurs independently of observed individual characteristics at the time of
labor market entry. However, due to the endogenous accumulation of experience and wealth occurring within
the model, preference heterogeneity will correlated with observed individual characteristics at dates subsequent
to labor market entry. We will estimate the model directly and therefore our empirical analysis accounts fully for
such processes.
8The "s are assumed to occur independently over individuals. The "s for individual i are assumed to occur
independently over time and over the labor market states j = f; u; r. Further, the individual's age t "s are assumed
to be independent of the individual's age t observed characteristics. Additionally, "i;j;t for all i, j and t is assumed
to have a type I extreme value distribution. The inclusion of this form of unobservables in the ow utilities has
the eect of smoothing the value function and thus facilitates estimation of the structural parameters.
9The utility function described by equations (1) and (2) is a minor generalization of a Cobb-Douglas utility
function: Equations (1) and (2) can be rewritten as
Ui;t(ci;t; j) = c
1 
i;t L

i;j + i;j;t for j = f; u; r; (3)
where i;j;t = 
 1(1 )"i;j;t and Li;j = (1 iHj)(1 )= where Hj represents the percentage of full-time working
hours spent in employment in state j (for the labor market states appearing in our model we have Hu = Hr = 0
and Hf = 1).
10The German tax, transfer and pension systems were subject to several reforms during the sample period. We
model current net income as a function of the contemporaneous tax, transfer and pension systems. We assume
that individuals expect that the current tax and transfer systems will persist into future years (see Keane, 2011,
for further discussion of this assumption). This assumption is plausible because the reforms of the tax and transfer
systems that occurred during the sample period either were announced at short notice or had highly uncertain
implementation schedules. We also assume that individuals expect that the cohort-specic rules dening the
public pension system will be maintained indenitely. In Appendix F.4 we argue that this assumption is realistic.
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Individuals are forward-looking and each period make employment, retirement and con-
sumption decisions to maximize the discounted expected value of future utility. An individual's
optimization problem age t is given by
max
d;c
Et
TX
s=t
s tki;s;tUi;s(ci;s; di;s): (4)
In the above di;t 2 ff; u; rg is a categorial variable which codes the individual's age t labor
supply and retirement behavior. The variable d details the individual's employment and retire-
ment behavior in each remaining period of the individual's life. Similarly, c is a vector that
describes the individual's consumption choice in each remaining period of the individual's life.
The operator Et is an expectation conditional on the individual's age t information set. Payos
occurring in the future are discounted due to subjective time discounting and mortality risk;
 2 [0; 1] is the subjective time discount factor, and ki;s;t is the probability of the individual
surviving until age s conditional on being aged t.
The inclusion of survival probabilities in the individual's objective function reects the de-
pendence of life-cycle utility on life expectancy. We follow, inter alios, De Nardi et al. (2010),
van der Klaauw and Wolpin (2008) and Rust and Phelan (1997) and allow individual-level het-
erogeneity in life expectancy. Specically, we allow variation in survival rates, and therefore life
expectancy, according to gender and region of residence. Additionally, extending on previous
studies, we allow life expectancy to be cohort-specic and therefore we capture the sizable im-
provements in life expectancy that have occurred in recent years. In Section 3.2 we discuss the
empirical relevance and statistical advantages associated with our relatively rich approach to
modeling life expectancy.
The optimization process is subject to an intertemporal budget constraint. In addition,
behavior is subject to constraints on borrowing and on the availability of employment and re-
tirement opportunities. We describe below: (i) the processes that determine job oers and
involuntary separations and thereby dictate employment opportunities; (ii) the composition of
gross wage income; (iii) public pension benets and early retirement opportunities; (iv) borrow-
ing constraints, consumption possibilities and the intertemporal budget constraint; and (v) the
optimal arrangement of employment, retirement and consumption over the life-cycle.
2.2 Employment Opportunities
An individual's behavior is constrained by the availability of employment opportunities (see
Blundell et al., 1987, and Blundell et al., 1998, for discussion of labor supply rationing). Ra-
tioning of labor supply is an important life-cycle phenomena: it contributes to prolonged periods
of unemployment and therefore aects retirement incentives when public pension benets are
linked to life-time labor market outcomes.
Employment opportunities are modeled as follows. Each period an unemployed individual
receives a job oer with probability i;t. Upon receipt of a job oer, the individual observes the
current gross wage, wi;t, associated with the job opportunity. The age t job oer probability
takes the form
i;t = (xi;t + 

i ): (5)
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Here and henceforth () denotes the cumulative distribution function of a standard normal
random variable. We allow the job oer probability to depend on age, region of residence and
health status, and variables measuring these characteristics are included in xi;t.  is a suitably
dimensioned parameter vector. Finally, i represents unobserved individual characteristics. An
individual in receipt of a job oer has the option of moving into employment in the current
period. With probability (1   i;t) a previously unemployed individual does not receive a job
oer at age t, in which case a transition into employment in the current period is impossible.
Similarly, each period an employed individual experiences an involuntary separation with
probability  i;t. The age t probability of an involuntary separation takes the form
 i;t = ( xi;t + 
 
i ); (6)
where   is a suitably dimensioned parameter vector and 
 
i is an unobserved individual eect.
An individual subject to an involuntary separation does not have the option of remaining in
employment in the current period. With probability (1  i;t) a previously employed individual
does not experience an involuntary separation and has the opportunity to stay in employment
and to be paid new gross wage, wi;t.
We interpret the unobserved individual eects that appear in the job oer and involuntary
separation probabilities as permanent unobserved individual characteristics that impact on an
individual's ability to nd or keep a job. These unobservables are assumed to be assigned to
an individual at the time of rst labor market entry. The joint distribution of the unobserved
individual eects is given by [i ; 
 
i ]ji  N(0;).
2.3 Gross Wage Oers
Gross wage income in an important component of current and future nancial incentives. There-
fore, we adopt the following rich specication for oered gross hourly wages
log(wi;t) = zi;t + i + i;t + i;t: (7)
In the above, zi;t contains observed individual characteristics including education, region of
residence and experience, and  is a suitably dimensioned parameter vector. The inclusion of
experience is important here because it captures the endogenous accumulation of experience-
based human capital (e.g., Eckstein and Wolpin, 1989, and Keane and Wolpin, 1997).
The nal three terms in the wage equation are the unobserved components of wages. i is
a permanent individual-specic random eect, representing ability or skill. We take i to be
assigned to an individual at the time of rst labor market entry and assume iji  N(0; 2).
i;t is a persistent unobservable, which we interpret as an employer-employee match-specic pro-
ductivity eect. For an individual who was employed in the previous period, i;t keeps the same
value as in the previous period with probability , and with probability (1 ) the individual's
match-specic productivity is subject to a shock. In the latter case, the individual receives a
new match-specic productive eect i;tj'i;t  N(0; 2 ), where 'i;t denotes the individual's age
t characteristics, including previous labor market outcomes and previous unobserved character-
istics. An individual who was unemployed in the previous period and who is in receipt of a job
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oer in the current period receives a new match-specic productivity shock i;tj'i;t  N(0; 2 ).
In contrast to Low et al. (2010), we do not model or observe transitions between employers; we
identify  and 2 from the persistence in individual-specic wage observations (see Table 6).
Finally, i;tj'i;t  N(0; 2) is a transitory wage shock. The parameters of the wage process are
estimated jointly with the other structural parameters (see Section 4.1).11
2.4 Public Pension Benets and Early Retirement Opportunities
Similar to many public pension systems, German public pension benets reect an individual's
employment and earnings outcomes prior to retirement, and this linkage works to strengthen the
interplay between life expectancy, the public pension system and life-cycle behavior. We provide
here an overview of the relevant aspects of the German public pension system. Unless noted
otherwise, the model is estimated with the specication of pension benets described below.
Further details can be found in Appendix F.12
Public pension benets in Germany are linked to an individual's labor market history via a
quantity we refer to as \weighted pension points". An individual accumulates one pension point
for every year of employment and such pension points attract a weight of minfwi;t=wi;t;Maxi;tg,
where wi;t denotes the mean gross wage in the period when individual i is age t and Maxi;t
denotes the year-specic cap on pension point weights. During the sample period, the cap on
pension point weights was roughly equal to two in all years. An individual also accumulates one
pension point for every year of Unemployment Insurance-eligible unemployment. Such pension
points are allocated a weight of minf0:8  wi;t0=wi;t; 0:8 Maxi;tg, where t0 denotes the age
at which the individual was last employed. Thus, up to a cap of roughly 1.6, an unemployed
individual's pension points are weighed by the ratio of 80% of the individual's most recent gross
wage relative to the current mean gross wage.
Age-based criteria govern access to public pension benets and the generosity of public
pension benets. Arguably the most important age-based parameter is the full pensionable age.
At this age, which is 65 years for the individuals under study, an individual can retire and receive
a publicly provided pension with a value proportional to the sum of weighted pension points
accumulated prior to retirement. The German public pension system is relatively generous:
according to Borsch-Supan and Schnabel (1998), in 1998 public pension benets provided a
replacement rate of around 70% of pre-retirement net earnings for an individual retiring at the
full pensionable age with 45 years of working experience and average life-time earnings.
The public pension system oers numerous opportunities for retirement prior to the full
pensionable age and our model captures most important routes into early retirement. Specif-
ically, our model recognizes that an individual may be eligible for retirement prior to the full
pensionable age on the grounds of: (i) gender, specically being a woman; (ii) disability; or
(iii) working history, specically having previously worked at least 35 years. Eligibility for early
11At all ages the three unobserved components of wages are assumed to be mutually independent and indepen-
dent of the unobservables [i ; 
 
i ] that aect the job oer and involuntary separation probabilities.
12Borsch-Supan and Wilke (2004) note that the public pension system in Germany accounts for approximately
85% of pension income, while individual and occupational pensions account for 10% and 5% of pension income
respectively. We refrain from modeling individual and occupational pensions. Instead, we assume that the
provision for private saving aorded by our model approximates the saving opportunities oered by individual
and occupational pensions.
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retirement on the grounds of gender or working history is dependant on the individual's age
(e.g., only those who have worked at least 35 years may retire from age 63 years). The age,
gender and working history-based eligibility criteria for early retirement are entirely objective
and the relevant rules are hard-coded into the model. When doing this, we account fully for
intertemporal variation in the early retirement eligibility criteria. In contrast, the rules that
determine eligibility for public pension benets on the grounds of disability are complex and
the operationalization of these rules has inevitably been somewhat subjective. For the purpose
of implementing our model, we assume that individual i has a probability i;t of being eligible,
due to disability, for early retirement. The age t probability of being eligible for public pension
benets on the grounds of disability is as follows
i;t = (qi;t); (8)
where qi;t contains variables that measure the individual's gender and health status, and  is a
suitably dimensioned parameter vector. The per-year value of public pension for an individual
taking early retirement depends on the year-specic legislation, gender, disability status, working
history and age. Appendix F.3 provides further details.
2.5 Borrowing, Consumption and the Intertemporal Budget Constraint
Individuals may save and borrow. Wealth (Wi;t) here refers to an individual's private wealth
holdings, and therefore excludes the value of any entitlements to the public pension or other
social programs. The individual faces borrowing constraints which restrict wealth to be non-
negative, that is Wi;t  0. This assumption, which follows French (2005) and Low et al. (2010),
reects that borrowing typically requires collateral and that individuals are unable to borrow
against future earnings or future Unemployment Insurance, Social Assistance or public pension
benets.
Subject to the above-described borrowing constraint, each period, a non-retired individual
chooses a consumption level, ci;t. Quarter-by-quarter wealth accumulation for a non-retired
individual is described by the following intertemporal budget constraint
Wi;t+0:25 =Wi;t + 1(di;t = f)mi;f;t + 1(di;t = u)mi;u;t   ci;t: (9)
In the above mi;f;t and mi;u;t are the net incomes that arise from full-time employment and
unemployment. (These net incomes are determined by the tax and transfer systems, gross wage
income and income from wealth - see Appendix E). Note that, given consumption behavior,
wealth accumulation depends on the real interest as the net incomes mi;f;t and mi;u;t include the
net-of-tax value of interest income. In contrast to the models of retirement behavior developed
by, e.g., French and Jones (2011) and Rust and Phelan (1997), we do not include medical
expenses. This is reasonable because Germany has a universal health care system.
We assume that a retired individual's consumption is consistent with the actuarially fair
annuity value of accumulated wealth. The per-period consumption enjoyed by an individual
who retires at age t thus given by
cri;t = mi;r;t + ai;t; (10)
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where ai;t denotes per-period annuity value of wealth for an individual who retires at age t. This
specication captures the primary intertemporal incentives important for the current application.
In particular: (i) wealth accumulation prior to retirement is valuable in retirement; (ii) the value
of accumulated wealth is negatively related to life expectancy (as the actuarially fair annuity
value of wealth depends negatively on life expectancy); and (iii) nancing consumption out of
accumulated wealth is a substitute for funding consumption from public pension benets.
2.6 Optimal Labor Supply, Retirement and Consumption
2.6.1 Solution Method
Drawing on dynamic programming techniques, we use our model to describe an individual's op-
timal employment, retirement and consumption behavior over the life-cycle. An individual's age
t optimization problem can be expressed in terms of the state-specic value functions V j;ct (pi;t)
for j = f; u; r, which dene the maximized discounted expected value of the individual's future
life-cycle utility conditional on being in state j with current consumption of c. Here, pi;t denotes
the time t values of the state variables for individual i.13 Using t to denote the individual's age
in the next quarter, i.e., t  t+0:25, the state-specic value functions are dened recursively as
follows
V f;ct (pi;t) = Ui;t(c; f) + ki;t;tEt

 i;t

i;tmaxfV ut (pi;t); V rt (pi;t)g+ (1  i;t)V ut (pi;t)
	
+
(1   i;t)
n
i;tmaxfV ft (pi;t); V ut (pi;t); V rt (pi;t)g+ (1  i;t)maxfV
f
t
(pi;t); V
u
t (pi;t)g
oi
;(11)
V u;ct (pi;t) = Ui;t(c; u) + ki;t;tEt

(1 i;t)

i;tmaxfV ut (pi;t); V rt (pi;t)g+ (1  t)V ut (pi;t)
	
+
i;tfi;tmaxfV ft (pi;t); V ut (pi;t); V rt (pi;t)g+ (1  i;t)maxfV
f
t
(pi;t); V
u
t (pi;t)gg
i
; (12)
V rt (pi;t) = Ui;t(c
r
i;t; r) + ki;t;tEtV
r
t (pi;t): (13)
In (11)-(13) above, i;t is the individual's probability of being eligible for retirement at age t.
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Meanwhile, V f
i;t
(pi;t) and V
u
i;t
(pi;t) are dened as the age t value functions associated with age
t employment and unemployment, respectively, after age t consumption has been optimized.
Specically,
V j
i;t
(pi;t) = maxc
V j;c
i;t
(pi;t) for j = f; u: (15)
13The state variable are: W ; q; ;  ; ;  ; ; "j for j = f; u; r; ; z; x; and the current values of the
parameters that dene the tax, transfer and pension systems. See Sections 2.1-2.5 for further details.
14Following the discussion above in Section 2.4, an individual may be eligible for retirement at age t either on
the grounds of disability, an event which occurs with probability i;t as dened above in equation (8), or due to
having satised the relevant age, gender and working history based criteria. Therefore, the probability of an age
t individual being eligible for retirement, i;t, takes the following form:
i;t =

1 if age, gender and working history based criteria for retirement eligibility are satised;
i;t otherwise:
(14)
Finally, all individuals may retire at the full pensionable age of 65 years and therefore we have i;65 = 1.
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Subject to the above discussed constraints on the availability of employment opportuni-
ties and on wealth accumulation, each period, an individual is able to adjust his or her em-
ployment, retirement and consumption behavior. At age t, a forward-looking optimizing in-
dividual in possession of a job oer but not eligible for retirement will choose employment
and a current-period consumption level of c0 if and only if V f;c
0
t (pi;t) > maxc;c 6=c0 V
f;c
t (pi;t)
and V f;c
0
t (pi;t) > maxc V
u;c
t (pi;t), and otherwise will choose unemployment and consumption
c = maxc V
u;c
t (pi;t). If such an individual instead is eligible for retirement then he or she will
choose employment and a current-period consumption level of c0 if, in addition to the previous
two inequalities, it is also the case that V f;c
0
t (pi;t) > V
r
t (pi;t). An individual who does not have a
job oer and is not eligible early retirement will be unemployed with a current-period consump-
tion level of c = maxc V
u;c
t (pi;t). Alternatively, if this individual is eligible for retirement then
he or she will choose unemployment with a current-period consumption level of c0 if and only
if V u;c
0
t (pi;t) > maxc;c 6=c0 V
u;c
t (pi;t) and V
u;c0
t (pi;t) > V
r
t (pi;t). Upon reaching the full pensionable
age all remaining non-retired individuals must enter retirement.
2.6.2 Discussion
Several mechanisms link an individual's current employment, retirement and consumption deci-
sions with expected future payos. We discuss here those intertemporal linkages related directly
to retirement and explain the interaction of these intertemporal linages with life expectancy.
Current employment adds to an individual's stock of pension points and therefore, holding
xed the age of retirement, increases pension income retirement. Current unemployment has a
similar albeit smaller eect, provided that the unemployed individual is receiving Unemployment
Insurance. Furthermore, working in the current period adds to the individual's experience which,
in the presence of positive wage returns to experience, leads to higher expected future wage oers
and, ceteris paribus, to higher public pension benets in retirement. Finally, accumulation of
wealth prior to retirement, ceteris paribus, allows an individual to increase income in retirement.
Life expectancy interacts with the above-described intertemporal dependencies. An increase
in life expectancy increases the expected duration over which an individual will receive public
pension benets. An increase in life expectancy therefore, ceteris paribus, raises the expected
return to accumulation of pension points, and creates an incentive to postpone retirement.
Further, an increase in life expectancy increases the time over which an individual may enjoy
the returns from accumulated wealth. Therefore, ignoring interactions with other behavioral
adjustments, the incentive to save is increasing in life expectancy.
However, the total eect of an increase in life expectancy on behavior over the life-cycle
is, a priori, impossible to determine. Since savings and entitlements to public pension benets
are substitutes in terms of their eects on utility in retirement, individuals may respond to
an increase in life expectancy by increasing employment and reducing wealth accumulation, or
vice versa. Moreover, an increase in life expectancy may lead to higher saving or increased
employment early in the life-cycle followed by earlier retirement. Optimizing behavior does,
however, rule out an increase in life expectancy causing weakly lower saving and weakly higher
unemployment early in the life-cycle followed by strictly earlier retirement.
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3 Data Sources and Sample Selection
Estimation uses data from the German Socio-Economic Panel and the HumanMortality Database.
3.1 German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP)
The German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) is an annual, representative panel survey of over
11000 German households. As described by Wagner et al. (2007), the SOEP contains informa-
tion about socio-economic variables, including income and working behavior, at the individual
and household levels. We use the SOEP surveys from the years 1992 - 2008, which contain
retrospective information covering the scal years 1991 - 2007.
Our sample selection criteria are designed to ensure a clean empirical implementation above-
described theoretical model. As justied in Section 2.1, we use a sample of individuals aged
40 - 65 years who reside in single adult households and who do not have dependent children.15
Further, we exclude from our analysis those individuals whose primary earnings are from self-
employment as well as those in full-time education because, in both cases, labor supply behavior
diers substantially from that of the rest of the population under analysis. Our nal sample is
an unbalanced panel with 40409 person-quarter observations. The sample contains 2389 distinct
individuals of whom 55% are women.
The SOEP data set contains detailed self-reported information about individuals' employ-
ment and retirement behavior in each month. We group the monthly information and form
quarterly observations with an individual's labor market status in the rst month of the quarter
determining the quarterly outcome. All individuals who report that they are currently retired,
or who have reported being retired at some point in the past, are classied as retired. In addi-
tion, any individuals who report being non-retired at age 65 or older are reclassied as retired.16
The group of unemployed individuals comprises non-working, non-retired individuals. Given
this denition, an unemployed individual is either voluntarily or involuntarily unemployed; this
construction is in line with the theoretical framework, in which involuntary job separations, vol-
untary quits and refusals of job oers are permitted.17 A measure of experience at the time that
the individual entered the sample is constructed from retrospective information. This variable
is updated at quarterly intervals over the sample period in accordance with the individual's
observed employment behavior.
Figure 1 shows the shares of employment, unemployment and retirement by age for men
and women and for east and west Germans, averaged over the observation period. We note
that early retirement common for individuals in their late 50s and early 60s. Further, there
are large dierences in employment and retirement behavior according to region of residence:
averaged over the whole age distribution, the employment rate is about 10 percentage points
higher in west Germany than in the east, and older east Germans have a higher propensity to
15We assume that family composition does not change in the future. However, our model is fully applicable to
individuals who have experienced alternative household compositions, specically martial status and dependent
children, before entering the sample. Appendix C explains how this is achieved.
16Our denition of retirement corresponds closely to observed behavior: Fewer than 5% of retired individuals
are simultaneously in employment and only 1% of retired individuals report that they work full-time. Fewer than
1% of the sampled individuals continue to work beyond age 65 years.
17Given our sample selection criteria, less than 5% of the male (female) population under study works fewer
than 30 (25) hours per week. It is therefore reasonable to treat all employment as full-time work.
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Figure 1: Employment, unemployment and retirement over the life-cycle by gender and region
of residence
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retire than west Germans of the same age. These dierences are likely related to the relatively
poor economic conditions in east Germany.
The SOEP data set includes individuals' gross earnings in the month prior to the interview
date. Using the corresponding working hours, including hours of payed overtime work, we
construct a gross hourly wage measure. We follow Fuchs-Schuendeln and Schuendeln (2005)
and construct a measure of individual-level wealth based on the yearly nancial information
available in the SOEP. Specically, an individual's wealth is dened as the sum of net property
equity and non-property wealth, where the latter is computed from capital income assuming
a real rate of return of 3% per annum.18 Wealth and wages are converted to year 2000 prices
using the Retail Price Index. The average observed gross hourly wage is 15.65 Euros and average
individual wealth is 40037 Euros.
3.2 Human Mortality Database (HMD)
We obtain information about longevity in Germany from the relevant life tables in the Human
Mortality Database (HMD).19 The life tables include survival probabilities and life expectancies
that vary by age, birth cohort, region of residence (east or west Germany) and gender and
are available for the years 1991 - 2007. Based on the information in the HMD, we assign a
18A real interest rate of 3% per annum is in line with the rates prevailing in the capital markets: Deutsche
Bundesbank (2001) reports an average ex ante real interest rate of 3.13% in Germany for the period 1994-2001
(based on estimated ination), and this result is supported by the calculations of Garnier et al. (2005).
19Human Mortality Database is provided by the University of California, Berkeley (USA) and Max Planck
Institute for Demographic Research (Germany). The database is available at www.mortality.org.
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Figure 2: Life expectancy at age 40 years: evolution over time in east and west Germany
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Source: Authors' calculations based on the Human Mortality Database.
demographic group-specic and cohort-specic survival probability and life expectancy to each
observation in our SOEP sample.20
Figure 2 shows the evolution over time of life expectancy at age 40 years for east and
west German men and women. As expected, we observe longer life expectancies for women
and, irrespective of gender or region, an upward trend in life expectancy over time. As well
documented in the demographic literature, e.g., Gjonca et al. (2000), life expectancy in east
Germany in 1991, immediately after German reunication, was considerably lower than in west
Germany: in 1991 a 40 year old east German man expected to live 2.7 years less than his west
German counterpart, and the corresponding dierence for women was 2.4 years. More important
for our purposes are the dierent time trends by gender and region: between 1991 and 2007,
there was a strong east-west convergence in life expectancy for women and moderate east-west
convergence for men. Specically, by 2003 there was hardly any east-west dierence in life
expectancy for women and by 2007 the east-west life expectancy gap for men had fallen to one
year. According to Gjonca et al. (2000), Nolte et al. (2002) and Kibele and Scholz (2008), the
leading reason for this convergence was improvements in the medical system in east Germany.
In light of the above documented heterogeneity in life expectancy, in the empirical implemen-
tation of our structural life-cycle model we permit variation in life expectancy according to age,
birth cohort, gender and region of residence. This maximizes the model's accuracy. Further-
more, by drawing on variation between demographic groups in the extent of improvements in life
expectancy over time, we are able to estimate the relationship between life expectancy and retire-
ment decisions, controlling for age, time and cohort eects. This quantity is informative about
the extent to which individuals condition behavior on objectively-measured life expectancy. As
a powerful in-sample goodness of t test, we compare the relationship between life expectancy
and retirement decisions as implied by our estimation results with the corresponding quantity
20The HMD does not contain information about marital status. In general, the life expectancy of single in-
dividuals tends to be lower than that of married individuals. This may lead bias our estimate of the subjective
time discount factor downwards. However, we are not concerned about this issue as there is evidence the rela-
tionship between life expectancy and marital status is strongest for prime-age individuals and is weak, or even
nonexistent, for older individuals (see Johnson et al., 2000). Moreover, it is likely that individuals are less well
informed about the relationship between life expectancy and marital status than they are about variation in life
expectancy according to gender, region or birth cohort.
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observed in our sample.21
4 Estimation Strategy and Results
4.1 Estimation, Identication and Treatment of the Initial Conditions
As in Gourinchas and Parker (2002), French (2005) and French and Jones (2011), we estimate
the parameters of our model using the Method of Simulated Moments (MSM): parameters are
chosen to minimize the distance between a set of moments pertaining to the values of the
endogenous variables, namely wages, wealth levels, and employment and retirement outcomes,
as observed in our sample and the average values of the same moments in a number of simulated
data sets. The construction of each simulated data set starts from the empirical distribution
of the exogenous individual characteristics, such as gender, education and region of residence,
observed in our sample. Given a trial parameter vector t, we simulate initial values of the
endogeneous variables by drawing from a reduced form model. We then simulating wage oers
and employment, retirement and consumption outcomes in subsequent quarters of the sample
period based on the above-described structural model. The value function is approximated using
the simulations and interpolation method described in Appendix A.
Suppose that a total of p moments are used in the MSM estimation. Let Mo denote the
p-by-1-dimensional vector of moments constructed from our sample observations. Further, let
M sk(t) denote the same vector of moments constructed using the k
th simulated sample obtained
using the parameter vector t. The MSM parameter estimates are the value of t that minimizes
the weighted quadratic distance (M
s
(t)  Mo)0W (M s(t)  Mo), where W is a xed p-by-p-
dimensional positive semidenite weighting matrix and M
s
(t) denotes the value of the vector
of simulated moments averaged over K simulated data sets, each obtained using the parameter
vector t.
22 Under the conditions stated in Pakes and Pollard (1989), the MSM estimator is
consistent and asymptotically normally distributed.
Estimation uses 265 moments and we estimate 82 parameters. The subjective time discount
factor, , and the utility curvature parameter, , are identied from information on wealth
holdings and saving behavior according to age; knowledge of average wealth is sucient to
identify either  or , while with additional information on variation in wealth according to age
we can identify both parameters. Ordinary Least Squared (OLS) coecients from regressions of
wages and transitions between labor market states on demographic variables provide moments
that identify the eects of observed individual characteristics on wages, job oers and involuntary
separations. See Appendix B for further details.
As described in Section 3.1, we sample wages only in quarters that coincide with the ad-
ministration of the annual SOEP survey and only for employed individuals who answered all
21In dierent settings, Alesina and Fuchs-Schuendeln (2007), Fuchs-Schuendeln (2008) and Fuchs-Schuendeln
and Schuendeln (2005) also exploit variation generated by German reunication.
22For the purpose of estimation, we set K = 5. We thus simulate the employment, retirement and consumption
decisions of around 12000 hypothetical individuals in a total of approximately 200000 time periods. Employing
the optimal weighting matrix, that is the inverse covariance matrix of the chosen moments, can lead to small
sample bias (see Altonji and Segal, 1996). Therefore, we use a diagonal weighting matrix with diagonal elements
equal to the inverse of the variances of the sample moments, estimated by bootstrap re-sampling with clustering
at the individual level.
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required survey questions. Our estimation strategy accounts for selectivity in wage observations.
We therefore represent correctly the nancial incentive to work and capture accurately the value
of future public pension benets. In the MSM estimation routine we account to selectivity in
wages by matching moments based on sample wage observations with moments constructed us-
ing simulated wage draws that have survived the same selection mechanisms as the sample wage
observations.23 A simulated wage draw is included in the construction of the simulated moments
if and only if: (i) employment is the individual's optimal choice in the simulated sample; (ii) the
quarter is one in which the individual was surveyed; and (iii) the observation survived random
elimination of accepted wage draws designed to account for non-random non-response.24 Non-
labor income and non-linearities in the tax and transfer schedules provide exclusion restrictions
and thus ensure that identication of the parameters in the wage equation is not reliant purely
on functional form.
Appendix C provides further details concerning our treatment of the initial conditions and
presents estimates of the parameters that characterize the initial conditions. We note here
that the parameters appearing in the initial conditions are estimated jointly with the structural
parameters. Further, by including unobservables that may aect both the initial conditions
and subsequent behavior, our estimation methodology accounts fully for the endogeneity of the
initial observations of individuals' experience, wages, wealth and employment status.25
4.2 Goodness of Fit and Structural Parameter Estimates
The estimated model is able to t the observed relationship between life expectancy and re-
tirement. We thus conclude that our model provides a sound basis for counterfactual policy
simulations which investigate the eect of life expectancy on life-cycle behavior. In more de-
tail, we obtain a summary measure of the observed relationship between life expectancy and
retirement by running an OLS regression of retirement on age 65 life expectancy, age dummies,
cohort dummies and time dummies. (We are able to separate cohort eects from the eect of
life expectancy due to the presence of dierences between demographic groups in the extent of
improvements in life expectancy over time.) The coecient on life expectancy in this OLS regres-
sion is -0.066 (with a robust individual-level clustered standard error of 0.027). Meanwhile, the
corresponding coecient on life expectancy implied by the estimated structural model is -0.059,
which is less than 0.3 of a standard error away from the corresponding observed quantity.
Our model is also able to replicate observed features of: the distributions of wages and
changes in wages; life-cycle labor supply and retirement behavior; the age prole of wealth; and
the patterns of transitions between employment and unemployment (see Appendix D).
Table 1 reports the structural parameter estimates. Looking rst at the wage equation, we
23Note that our structural model features the joint determination of wage and employment outcomes and
therefore accepted simulated wage oers are subject to the same selectivity as sample wage observations.
24We estimate the probability of an employed individual refusing to answer one or more of the survey questions
required to construct the hourly wage. We then exclude the simulated wage draws of employed individuals with
the same probability. This method assumes that survey non-response is base purely on observables.
25Health, measured by an indicator of the individual having health problems that limit daily activities, enters
the model as a stochastic and exogenous state variable. We estimate the parameters of an equation of motion for
health in which an individual's age t health status is a function of health status in the previous period, age and
demographic variables. The parameters from this initial estimation are used to simulate the evolution of health
when estimating the parameters of the structural model.
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Table 1: Structural parameter estimates
Coecient Standard Error
Wage Equation
Intercept 1.564 0.076
Male 0.069 0.056
West German 0.335 0.046
Male  West German 0.154 0.065
Education (years)/10 0.834 0.053
Experience (years)/50 0.330 0.090
Native German 0.079 0.035
(Age  54)I(54  Age < 59)=10 -0.040 0.097
(Age  59)I(Age  59)=10 -0.181 0.138
Health problems -0.038 0.033
Probability of receiving a new match-specic eect () 0.148 0.048
Standard deviation of match-specic eect ( ) 0.085 0.008
Standard deviation of permanent individual eect () 0.222 0.034
Standard deviation of transitory shock () 0.023 0.006
Job Oer Probability ()
Intercept -2.374 -0.144
(Age  40)I(40  Age < 54)=14 -0.278 0.166
(Age  54)I(54  Age < 59)=5 -1.311 0.271
(Age  59)I(Age  59)=5 -0.398 0.731
West German 0.814 0.133
Health problems -0.197 0.206
Standard deviation of individual eect in job oer probability (11) 1.029 0.064
Involuntary Separation Probability ( )
Intercept -4.759 0.339
(Age  40)I(40  Age < 54)=14 2.984 0.388
(Age  54)I(54  Age < 59)=5 0.337 0.204
(Age  59)I(Age  59)=5 2.984 0.459
West German -1.940 0.288
Health problems 0.964 0.218
Standard deviation of individual eect in separations (22) 0.798 0.125
Covariance between individual eects in arrivals and separations (12) -0.657 0.124
Preferences
Coecient on consumption () 5.839 1.046
CRRA () 2.565 0.138
Mean of complementary parameter () 0.221 0.044
Standard deviation of complementarity parameter () 0.112 0.059
Annual subjective time discount factor () 0.989 0.008
Probability of Retirement Eligibility on the Grounds of Disability ()
Intercept -0.745 0.457
Health problems 0.797 0.414
Male 0.384 0.374
Notes: \Health problems" is an indicator of the individual having health problems that limit daily
activities. The mean and standard deviation of the complementarity parameter (i) after allowing
for truncation are 0.231 (with a standard error of 0.023) and 0.106 (with a standard error of 0.028)
respectively.
nd that oered wages increase signicantly with experience. This nding underlines the impor-
tance of experience-based human capital accumulation in the determination of wage oers, and
more generally for labor supply behavior over the life-cycle. Oered wages are higher in west
Germany than in the east, and native Germans and men receive signicantly higher wage oers
than immigrants and women respectively. The estimated rate of return to one year of education
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is 8.34%. Unobservables are found to play an important role in wage determination. Of the
permitted unobservables, the permanent individual eect (i) has the highest standard devia-
tion and therefore has the largest impact on wage oers. This nding implies that unobserved
dierences in wages are driven primarily by dierences in permanent unobserved individual char-
acteristics. However, we also nd a signicant unobserved match-specic eect; quantitatively,
we nd that each quarter an individual has a 14.8% chance of receiving a new match-specic
draw. This corresponds to an individual receiving a new match-specic draw on average every
6.8 quarters.26
The job oer and involuntary separation probabilities display clear age patterns: older indi-
viduals are less likely to receive a job oer and are more likely to be subject to an involuntary
separation than younger individuals. As expected, those in poor health and those living in east
Germany are relatively likely to experience an involuntary separation and are relatively unlikely
to receive a job oer. Unobserved individual characteristics have signicant eects on the job
oer and involuntary separation probabilities. The unobservables aecting job oers and invol-
untary separations are signicantly negatively correlated, a result which is consistent with those
unobserved characteristics that contribute positively to involuntary separations also having a
negative eect on the probability of receiving a job oer. We nd that the probability of being
eligible for early retirement on the grounds of disability is positively and signicantly (at the
5.4% level) related to the presence of health problems.
The coecient on consumption, , is signicantly greater than zero which implies that indi-
viduals' behavior is inuenced by the nancial incentives associated with employment, retirement
and wealth accumulation. We nd that i, the individual-specic parameter that describes the
complementarily between consumption and leisure, varies signicantly over individuals. More-
over, after allowing for truncation of i from above at 0.999 and from below at 0, the mean
value of i is 0.231. This implies that on average 23.1% of consumption is required to com-
pensate an employed individual for the disutility of working. Our estimate of the annualized
subjective time discount factor is 0.989, a gure which is in line with previous ndings (e.g.,
De Nardi et al., 2010). Finally, our estimate the CRRA parameter, , is 2.565 and we therefore
individuals are risk averse. Both the subjective time discount factor and the CRRA parame-
ter are precisely estimated, which lays testament to the quality and relevance of the available
consumption information.
5 Policy Analysis
5.1 Longevity, Life-cycle Behavior and Government Revenue
The behavioral and scal implications of increasing life expectancy must be understood prior to
determining how public pension systems may be reformed to ensure nancial stability in the face
of improving longevity. We thus commence our counterfactual analysis by using our estimated
structural life-cycle model to explore the eects of an increase in life expectancy. Specically,
we compare the optimal life-cycle behavior, and associated tax, transfer and pension receipts, of
26This results suggests that match-specic wage shocks occur at a higher frequency than job changes. Therefore,
we conclude that individuals can experience persistent wage shocks without changing jobs.
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Figure 3: Life expectancy improvement between 1942 and 1982 birth cohorts:
Eects over the life-cycle on rates of employment, unemployment and retirement and on net
Government revenue per person per month
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Notes: All gures refer to individuals aged 40-64.75 years.
two groups of individuals who dier only with respect to life expectancy. Each individual in the
rst group is assigned the appropriate gender-specic and region-specic life expectancy of the
1942 birth cohort, that is the life expectancy of an individual from the appropriate demographic
group who was 65 years old in 2007. Meanwhile, each individual in the second group is assigned
the appropriate predicted individual-specic life expectancy of the 1982 birth cohort, who will
reach age 65 years 40 years after individuals in the rst group, i.e., in 2047. According to the
HMD for Germany, life expectancy at age 65 is anticipated to be on average 6.4 years higher for
the 1982 birth cohort than for the 1942 birth cohort.27 For both groups of individuals, we x
the distribution of all characteristics other than life expectancy at that observed in our sample
and we impose the year 2007 tax, transfer and pension systems throughout.
Figures 3(a) - 3(c) show how the rates of employment, unemployment and retirement are
aected by the 6.4 year increase in age 65 years life expectancy anticipated to occur over the
next 40 years. This increase in life expectancy reduces the retirement rate by an average of
approximately 1 percentage point for those aged 57-64.75 years and by almost 3 percentage points
for individuals aged 64 years. The postponement of retirement among individuals approaching
the full pensionable age of 65 years is balanced by an increase in unemployment and, to a
27The corresponding increase in life expectancy at birth over the 40 years that separate these two cohorts is
roughly 10 years. Therefore, the anticipated evolution of life expectancy in Germany is broadly in line with the
widespread trend in life expectancy in the developed world documented by Oeppen and Vaupel (2002).
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Table 2: Life expectancy improvement between 1942 and 1982 birth cohorts:
Eects on average net Government revenue per person, years of employment post age 40 years,
retirement age and weighted pension points upon retirement.
Birth Public Pension: Average Life Net Government Revenue Per Person Yr Emp.
Ret. Age
Pension
Cohort FPA/ Pension Value Exp. at 65 All Emp. Unemp. Retired Age40 Points
1942 65/ 2007 System 83.3 57005 288249 -30682 -200562 17.75 62.35 39.29
1982 65/ 2007 System 89.7 -18446 294666 -31995 -281117 17.78 62.43 39.34
Change (1982   1942 cohort) 6.4 -75451 6418 -1312 -80556 0.03 0.08 0.05
Notes: \FPA" refers to the full pensionable age and \Pension Value" is the per-year value of public pension
benets. \Net Government Revenue Per Person" is the average per person (starting at age 40 years and
continuing until death) net revenue received by the Government, measured in Euors. \Yr Emp. Age  40" is
the average number of years of employment post age 40 years and \Ret. Age" is the average age of retirement.
\Pension Points" is the average number of weighted pension points accumulated prior to the date of retirement.
lesser extent, an increase in employment. There are two factors which lead the postponement
of retirement to be balanced predominantly by higher unemployment. First, those wanting to
retire later may have diculty nding a job due to the relatively low rate of job oers and the
relatively high rate of involuntary separations experienced by older individuals. Second, the
long entitlement period for Unemployment Insurance provide strong incentive for individuals to
use unemployment as a stepping-stone into retirement (see Appendix E.2).
Next, we consider the eect of an increase in life expectancy on net Government revenue,
NGR, which takes the following form
NGR = Income Tax + 2 SSC UIB  SAB  Public Pension Benets; (16)
where Income Tax consists of taxes paid on labor income, pension income and interest income
from wealth holdings, SSC denotes individual Social Security Contributions (this gure is multi-
plied by two because rms must match individuals' contributions), and UIB and SAB correspond
respectively to Unemployment Insurance benets and Social Assistance benets. Figure 3(d)
shows that the increase in public pension demands associated with longer life expectancy is
oset partly by higher revenue receipts from individuals aged below the full pensionable age.
Net Government revenue per person increases at every age prior to the full pensionable age of 65
years. Reecting the age prole of responses in labor supply and retirement, we nd the largest
increase in net Government revenue for individuals aged 64 years.
We now extend our analysis of the scal eects of an increase in life expectancy by addition-
ally considering net transfers made to individuals aged at or above the full pensionable age of 65
years. Based on the estimated model, we determine the net transfer made to the Government
by each individual in each quarter of his or her life, starting at age 40 years and continuing until
death. Summing over an individual's life yields the total post age 40 years net transfer made
by the individual to the Government. Finally, averaging over individuals provides an estimate
of average per-person net Government revenue. Table 2 shows that the 6.4 year increase in life
expectancy anticipated to occur over the next 40 years causes average per-person net Govern-
ment revenue to decrease by 75451 Euros. Decomposing, the increase in life expectancy under
consideration has a minor positive eect on the average transfer made to unemployed individ-
uals, and causes net Government revenue received from employed individuals to increase by an
average of 6418 Euros per person. However, the average net transfer made to retired individuals
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Table 3: Life expectancy improvement between 1942 and 1982 birth cohorts:
Implications for wealth accumulation and consumption
Birth Public Pension: Wealth on Monthly Income Total Cons. Monthly Consumption
Cohort FPA/Pension Value Retirement from Wealth post Age 40 Age 45 Age 55 FPA (Age 65)
1942 65/ 2007 System 27371 146 571197 1291 1341 1054
1982 65/ 2007 System 28402 126 665166 1294 1336 1035
Dierence (1982   1942 cohort): 1031 -20 93969 3 -5 -19
Notes: \Wealth on Retirement" is average per-person private wealth at the date of retirement. \Monthly
Income from Wealth" is the average per-person actuarially fair monthly annuity income wealth at the date
of retirement. Consumption (Cons.) gures are averaged over individuals. Consumption and wealth gures
are in Euros. \FPA" refers to the full pensionable age.
increase by 80556 Euros per person.
Last, we analyze the eect of life expectancy on consumption choices and wealth accumula-
tion. In response to an increase in life expectancy, optimizing individuals adjust consumption
to equalize the higher return to saving with marginal utility of contemporaneous consumption,
which in turn depends on current employment behavior. Empirically, Table 3 shows that the
considered 6.4 year increase in age 65 life expectancy leads average individual wealth at the
date of retirement to increase by 1031 Euros.28 This result, which is in line with the ndings
of De Nardi et al. (2009) and De Nardi et al. (2010), demonstrates that the ability to alter
wealth accumulation decisions provides individuals with a valuable means of adjusting behavior
in response to an improvement in longevity. Recognition of this fact is necessary for understand-
ing the eects of reductions in the generosity of the public pension system, discussed below in
Section 5.2.
Table 3 further shows that the increase in life expectancy anticipated to occur between the
1942 and 1982 birth cohorts leads to a 21 Euros per month fall in the income stream that retired
individuals are able to obtain from accumulated wealth. Thus, increased wealth accumulation
prior to retirement is insucient to compensate for the eect of higher life expectancy on the
feasible income stream obtainable from wealth holdings. Due to increased pension point accumu-
lation prior to retirement, we nd that the considered increase in age 65 life expectancy causes
average monthly consumption at age 65 years and above to fall by slightly less than the decline
in the feasible income stream obtainable from accumulated wealth. Specically, consumption at
age 65 years and above falls by an average of 19 Euros per month.
Notwithstanding the fall in the average monthly consumption of retired individuals, the
6.4 year increase in age 65 years life expectancy anticipated to occur between the 1942 and
1982 birth cohorts causes expected total per-person post age 40 years consumption to increase
by approximately 94000 Euros. As shown in Table 2, roughly 75000 Euros of this increase is
accounted for by increased transfers from the Government. Meanwhile, the remaining 19000
Euros of this increase is nanced from increased wage income and additional interest income
from wealth. Indeed, one of the eects of the improvement in longevity under study is to
cause the survival rate prior to the full pensionable age of 65 years to increase. Holding xed
employment and retirement choices, this change leads to an increase in expected life-time wage
income.
28This eect consists of a component arising from changes in savings decisions and a component due to alter-
ations in the timing of entry into retirement.
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5.2 Public Pension Reform
The substantial deterioration in the Government's budgetary position created by an increase in
life expectancy suggests an important role for public pension reforms. With this in mind, we
consider the 6.4 year increase in age 65 life expectancy anticipated to occur over the 40 years
that separate the 1942 and 1982 birth cohorts and we analyze the behavioral and scal eects
of: (i) increases in the full pensionable age; and (ii) cuts in the per-year value of public pension
benets. Throughout this analysis, we continue to x the distribution of all characteristics other
than life expectancy at that observed in our sample and we impose the year 2007 tax and transfer
systems. Unless otherwise indicated, we use the 2007 public pension system.
The top panel of Table 4 summarizes the eects on labor market behavior and net Govern-
ment revenue of increasing the full pensionable age from its current value of 65 years.29 We nd
that increases in the full pensionable lead individuals to postpone retirement and to increase
years of employment prior to retirement. Within the range of reforms under consideration, a
one year increase in the full pensionable age causes the average retirement age to increase by
approximately 0.9 of a year, and causes average years of employment prior to retirement to
increase by 0.85 of a year. The strong dependence of the employment rate on the age-based
eligibility requirements of the public pension system demonstrates that, for many individuals,
the rules that control access to public pension benets are binding constraints on behavior. This
nding is entirely consistent with the specics of the institutional rules. Indeed, according to
the 2007 public pension system, for the vast majority of individuals, retirement prior to the full
pensionable age either was not possible or was associated with reduced public pension benets
(see Appendix F.3). An increase in the full pensionable age, and the associated age-based eligi-
bility requirements, therefore raises the age at which most individuals can receive public pension
benets of a given level of generosity.
In terms of scal eects, we nd that increases in the full pensionable lead to appreciable
increases in the average net transfer made to the Government from employed individuals, and
cause substantial reductions in the average transfer payment made to retired individuals. Over-
all, our calculations suggest that the full pensionable age must be increased to 69.34 years to
oset the scal consequences for the Government of 40 years worth of growth in life expectancy.
In other words, a 6.4 year increase in age 65 life expectancy requires that the full pensionable
age be increased by 4.34 years in order to restore the Government's budgetary position.30 This
policy eliminates the approximately 75000 Euros per-person decit created by 40 years worth
of growth in life expectancy via two main routes. First, an increase of 4.34 years in the full
pensionable age increases the net transfer received by the Government from employed individ-
uals by an average of approximately 54000 Euros per person. Second, the net transfer made to
retired individuals declines by an average of roughly 23000 Euros per person.
The bottom panel of Table 4 summarizes the eects on labor market behavior and net
Government revenue of cuts in the per-year value of public pension benets. Throughout these
29When conducting this analysis the age-based requirements for early retirement were increased in line with
the increase in the full pensionable age.
30This gure was obtained by computing the net Government revenue associated with full pensionable ages of
69.25 years and 69.5 years and then interpolating linearly to nd the increase in the full pensionable age that
osets exactly the scal consequences of 40 years worth of growth in life expectancy.
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Table 4: Public pension reforms:
Eects on average net Government revenue per person, years of employment post age 40
years, retirement age and weighted pension points upon retirement
Birth Public Pension: Net Government Revenue Per Person Yr Emp.
Ret. Age
Pension
Cohort FPA/Pension Value All Employed Unemployed Retired Age40 Points
Increased full pensionable age:
1982 66/ 2007 System -65 308534 -31787 -276812 18.70 63.37 40.31
1982 67/ 2007 System 16392 320443 -32192 -271860 19.52 64.26 41.18
1982 68/ 2007 System 33096 332352 -33240 -266016 20.31 65.24 42.04
1982 69/ 2007 System 48140 341927 -33952 -259835 20.99 66.04 42.76
1982 70/ 2007 System 68620 356808 -33393 -254796 21.99 66.99 43.84
1982 71/ 2007 System 88413 371205 -33269 -249522 22.97 68.00 44.85
Revenue neutral full pensionable age:
1982 69.34/ 2007 System 57005 348609 -33314 -258290 21.42 66.39 43.24
Cut in the per-year value of public pension benets:
1982 65/ 2007 System   5% -6198 295143 -32936 -268405 17.79 62.58 39.39
1982 65/ 2007 System   10% 5427 295281 -33919 -255936 17.79 62.72 39.41
1982 65/ 2007 System   15% 16242 295205 -35060 -243903 17.77 62.86 39.43
1982 65/ 2007 System   20% 26699 295184 -36275 -232211 17.75 63.02 39.45
1982 65/ 2007 System   25% 36448 294996 -37609 -220938 17.72 63.19 39.47
1982 65/ 2007 System   30% 45290 294589 -38998 -210301 17.70 63.36 39.48
1982 65/ 2007 System   35% 53135 294053 -40520 -200398 17.66 63.54 39.48
1982 65/ 2007 System   40% 60231 293466 -41806 -191429 17.62 63.69 39.47
Revenue neutral cut in the per-year value of public pension benets:
1982 65/ 2007 System   37.7% 57005 293666 -41205 -195456 17.63 63.62 39.47
Notes: See Table 2.
calculations the full pensionable age is held xed at its current value of 65 years. This set of
reforms has little eect on employment outcomes. Further, cuts in the per year value of public
pension benets have only a minor postponement eect on retirement: we nd that the average
age of retirement increases by 0.20 of a year for every 5 percentage point cut in the per-year value
of public pension benets. These behavior adjustments reect partly that high wage individuals
are most aected by a cut in the per-year value of public pension benets. Such individuals are
likely to be employment, and hence are generally unable to increase employment. Furthermore,
a cut in the per-year value of public pension benets has an ambiguous eect on employment and
retirement incentives: A cut in the per-year value of public pension benets reduces expected
income in retirement for while simultaneously cutting future returns to current employment -
the associated income and substitution eects work in opposite directions. Thus, even when
aected individuals are in a position to adjust behavior, the realized behavior response may
be small, as is the case here. Cuts in the per-year value of public pension benets cause net
Government revenue to increase due to considerably lower net transfers to retired individuals.
We nd that the per-period value of public pension benets must be reduced by 37.7% in order
to counterbalance the scal consequences of 40 years worth of growth in life expectancy.
We conclude our analysis of public pension reforms with Table 5, which explores the eects of
increases in the full pensionable age and cuts in the per-year value of public pension benets on
individuals' wealth accumulation and consumption behavior. Mirroring the dierent responses
of labor supply and retirement, we nd that the two reforms have distinctly dierent implications
for wealth accumulation and consumption behavior.
Increases in the full pensionable age have little eect on wealth at the date of retirement
or on consumption at ages 45 or 55 years; the main means by which individuals re-optimize in
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Table 5: Public pension reforms:
Implications for wealth accumulation and consumption
Birth Public Pension: Wealth on Monthly Income Total Cons. Monthly Consumption
Cohort FPA/Pension Value Retirement from Wealth post age 40 Age 45 Age 55 FPA
Increased full pensionable age:
1982 66/ 2007 System 27593 124 674758 1300 1336 1053
1982 67/ 2007 System 28266 130 683404 1296 1334 1074
1982 68/ 2007 System 28001 131 690998 1296 1340 1091
1982 69/ 2007 System 28323 135 696110 1296 1338 1104
1982 70/ 2007 System 27928 137 705731 1298 1339 1127
1982 71/ 2007 System 28502 144 715758 1296 1339 1157
Revenue neutral full pensionable age:
1982 69.34/ 2007 System 27979 135 700469 1298 1339 1114
Cut in the per-year value of public pension benets:
1982 65/ 2007 System   5% 29751 132 654648 1291 1329 1004
1982 65/ 2007 System   10% 31022 138 644059 1289 1321 973
1982 65/ 2007 System   15% 32280 144 633804 1285 1314 943
1982 65/ 2007 System   20% 33369 149 623932 1282 1306 914
1982 65/ 2007 System   25% 34229 153 614358 1279 1300 886
1982 65/ 2007 System   30% 34747 156 605155 1277 1294 858
1982 65/ 2007 System   35% 35055 158 596543 1276 1289 831
1982 65/ 2007 System   40% 35249 160 588536 1274 1284 806
Revenue neutral cut in the per-year value of public pension benets:
1982 65/ 2007 System   37.7% 35138 157 592049 1275 1286 817
Notes: See Table 3.
response to an increase in the full pensionable age are adjustments in employment retirement
choices (see Table 4). This result can be understood as follows. Increases in the full pensionable
age create strong incentives for individuals to postpone retirement and to increase employment,
and thereby lead to higher public pension benets upon retirement. (Recall that public pension
benets in retirement are directly proportional to the individual's stock of pension points which,
in turn, is incremented for each and every year of employment or Unemployment Insurance
eligible unemployment). In this sense, this reform actually reduces the incentive for individuals
save privately retirement. However, the individuals whose retirement plans are most severely
aected by an increase in the full pensionable age are predominantly those individuals with
little or no personal wealth (as wealthy individuals are relatively unlikely to be constrained by
the institutional rules). Possibilities for wealth decumulation among the aected individuals are
therefore limited.
Increases in the full pensionable cause expected total post age 40 years consumption to in-
crease, a change that can be linked to increased consumption among retirees. Quantitatively,
consumption at the full pensionable age, i.e., the rst date at which all individuals are neces-
sarily retired, increases by an average of 122 Euros per month when the full pensionable age is
increased from 65 years to 71 years. This change reects predominantly the returns to higher
life-cycle employment which occur through the intertemporal linkages present in the public pen-
sion system. Increased income from wealth also contributes to the higher average consumption
of retirees, however the magnitude of this eect is relatively small.
In contrast, as illustrated in the bottom panel of Table 5, we nd that cuts in the per-year
value of public pension benets have a dramatic positive eect on wealth accumulation: for the
reforms under consideration, each 5 percentage point cut in the per-year value of public pension
benets leads average wealth accumulated at the date of retirement to increase by over 1000
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Euros per person. Moreover, given the modest eect of cuts in the per-year value of public
pension benets on the timing of retirement, increased wealth accumulation translates into a
higher feasible income stream obtainable upon retirement from accumulated wealth. These large
responses in savings behavior reect that, ceteris paribus, a cut in the per-year value of public
pension benets mechanically increases the marginal utility of income from wealth in retirement.
Combined with the theoretically ambiguous and empirically small eect of this reform on labor
supply and retirement behavior, it is natural that the predominant behavioral eect of a cut
in the per-year value of public pension benets is to cause an increase in wealth accumulation.
However, we nd that increased wealth accumulation prior to retirement is not sucient to
counter the income eects of a cut in the per-year value of public pension benets, irrespective
of the size of the cut. Therefore, following a cut in the per-year value of public pension benets,
monthly consumption at the full pensionable age decreases, as does expected total post age 40
years consumption.
In summary, an increase in the full pensionable age of 4.34 years and a cut in the per-year
value of public pension benets of 37.7% both neutralize the eect on the Government's net rev-
enue position of the 6.4 year increase in age 65 life expectancy anticipated to occur during the
40 years that separate the 1942 and 1982 birth cohorts. However, these two revenue-equivalent
policy approaches have dramatically dierent implications for individuals' labor supply and re-
tirement behavior, for wealth accumulation and for consumption outcomes. Notably, reinstating
the Government's budgetary position by increasing the full pensionable age leads to a higher
average retirement age and a higher employment rate as compared to if the Government's bud-
getary position is reinstated by cutting the per-year value of public pension benets; however,
cutting the per-year value of public pension benets has a much larger eect on wealth accumu-
lation than does increasing in the full pensionable age. Of these two revenue-equivalent policies,
expected total post age 40 years consumption is highest following the increase in the full pension-
able age. We conclude, therefore, that a reduction in public pension generosity operationalized
via an increase in the full pensionable age generates a greater increase in productivity than a
revenue-equivalent reform which entails a cut in the per-year value of public pension benets.
6 Conclusion
Life expectancy in the developed world is anticipated to increase appreciably over the coming
decades. In Germany, for example, life expectancy at age 65 years is projected to increase by
6.4 years over the next 40 years. This substantial demographic change poses a threat to the
sustainability of many dened benet public pension systems. Using a rich dynamic structural
life-cycle model estimated using the Method of Simulated Moments, this paper has provided new
insights into the eect of life expectancy on life-cycle behavior. Furthermore, by recognizing the
dependency between life-cycle behavior, life expectancy, and the public pension system, we
have demonstrated how public pensions systems can be reformed eectively to ensure nancial
viability despite increasing life expectancy.
Our results contain several lessons for policy makers contemplating public pension reforms.
At the highest level of generality, our analysis speaks to the particular importance of determining
the severity of public pension reforms specically for individuals who are able, forced or inclined
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to adjust behavior in response to the reform. For example, our results show that, in the case of
Germany, positive employment eects are obtained when the age-based eligibility thresholds for
public pension benets are increased but not when the per-year value of public pension benets
is cut. This result reects that the age-based eligibility rules are binding constraints for many
individuals. Meanwhile, cuts in the per-year value of public pension benets are felt most by
individuals with limited scope to increase work intensity due to their ex ante strong attachment
to the labor market.
Beyond to making a signicant contribution to the current policy debate on public pension
reform, this paper has provided several insights regarding the analysis of individual behavior
over the life-cycle. Notably, we have shown that the incentives created by the pension system are
important for explaining individuals' life-cycle employment, retirement and consumption deci-
sions. We conclude, therefore, that a detailed depiction of the pension system should be central
to the modeling of many aspects of life-cycle behavior. Perhaps more importantly, the results of
our counterfactual policy simulations have demonstrated that life expectancy has quantitatively
meaningful implications for optimal behavior prior to the full pensionable age. Our analysis thus
suggests that an accurate understanding of the scal and behavioral implications of improving
longevity requires a life-cycle approach which permits behavioral responses in terms of employ-
ment, retirement and consumption. Life-cycle modeling has been used previously to understand
the implications of life expectancy for decisions related to wealth accumulation. This paper
has explored the dependence of employment and retirement decisions, as well as consumption
choices, on life expectancy. Our analysis therefore extends previous research along an important
dimension.
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Appendix
A Value Function Approximation
Our method for approximating the value functions appearing in the life-cycle optimization prob-
lem is based on recursive simulation and interpolation, as rst introduced by Keane and Wolpin
(1994). In particular, we start with a set of randomly selected grid of points, where each grid
point represents a particular combination of age 64.75 years state variables and an age 64.75
employment and consumption choice. The age 64.75 years state variables are then updated to
the age 65 years values in accordance with the evolution of the underlying variables as speci-
ed by the structural model. Next, we evaluate the age 65 years value function at each point
in the grid of age 65 years state space points; at age 65 years all individuals are retired and
therefore computation of the age 65 years value function is straight forward and follows from
equation (13). The results of an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression are used to express
the expected age 65 years value function in terms of variables known to the individual at age
64.75 years. This OLS regression, as well as those used in later value function approximations,
includes a total of 143 regressors and is implemented using a grid containing 5000 points.
At the next stage of the value function approximation, we move back one quarter to age
64.5 years, update the state space variables to the age 64.75 values, and compute the age
64.75 years value function associated with each age 64.75 years choice possibility. Consumption,
or equivalently, savings, is a continuous choice variable and therefore implementation of this
method requires discretization of the choice set. We achieve this by restricting attention to the
following choices: (i) employment in conjunction with savings of -500, 0, 500, 1000 and 2000
Euros per month; (ii) unemployment in conjunction with savings of -2000, -1000, -500, 0, and 500
Euros per month; and (iii) retirement. We construct the choice set to over-represent dissaving
combined with unemployment and saving combined with employment because these are the
most prevalent combinations of savings and labor supply choices. We replace the expected
age 65 years value function appearing in the age 64.75 choice-specic value functions with the
approximation obtained previously. The maximum of the age 64.75 years choice-specic value
functions is regressed on variables known to the individual at age 64.5 years. The regression
results express the expected maximum of the age 64.75 years choice-specic value functions in
terms of variables known to the individual at age 64.5 years. We continue backwards recursively
in this way until we reach age 40 years. To ensure that we capture the year-specic aspects
of the scal legislation, this entire procedure is repeated for each of the 17 dierent tax and
transfer systems operational during the sample period.
B Moments
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Table 6: Summary of moments
Description of moments
Number
Primarily identifying
of moments
Wealth over the life-cycle: age-specic wealth levels and
wealth levels by gender and region
29
Subjective time discount factor () and
curvature parameter ()
Coecients from an OLS regression of annual wealth change
on age
2 As above
Coecient on life expectancy from an OLS regression of re-
tirement on life expectancy and controls for gender, region,
education, cohort and age
1 As above
Coecients from an OLS regression of log wages on experi-
ence, health, initial employment, region, education, nation-
ality, gender and age terms
14 Distribution of oered wages
Distribution of log wages: percentiles of log wages and an-
nual changes in log wages; 1st 2nd and 3rd order autocorre-
lations in annual log wages
19 As above
Treatment eects obtained from OLS regressions of transi-
tions between labor market states on the change in UI enti-
tlement period caused by the 1997 UI reform (see Haan and
Prowse, 2010)
20 Coecient on consumption ()
Coecients on initial employment state from OLS regres-
sions of employment and retirement on initial employment
state
2
Variance of complementarity between
consumption and leisure ()
Persistence in labor market status: frequencies of various
sequences of transitions
18
Parameters appearing in the job oer
and involuntary separation probabili-
ties
Labor supply over the life-cycle: age-specic employment
and retirement rates
50
Mean of the complementarity parame-
ter () and age eects in the job of-
fer and involuntary separation proba-
bilities
Coecients from OLS regressions of the individual-specic
numbers of transitions from unemployment to employment
and from employment to unemployment on initial employ-
ment state; Correlation between individual-specic numbers
of transition into and out of employment
3
Variance-covariance matrix of the
individual-specic unobservables in
the job oer and involuntary separa-
tion probabilities ()
Coecients from OLS regressions of transitions from unem-
ployment to employment and from unemployment to retire-
ment on experience, health, UI entitlement period, region,
and age terms
30
Parameters determining eligibility for
early retirement on the grounds of dis-
ability
Coecients from OLS regressions of transitions from employ-
ment to unemployment and from employment to retirement
on experience, health, UI entitlement period, region, and age
terms
28 As above
Coecients from OLS regressions of initial employment and
initial retirement on initial experience, initial health, gender,
region, education, nationality, children, martial status, age
terms and cohort eects
38
Parameters describing initial employ-
ment and initial retirement (see Ap-
pendix C)
Coecients from an OLS regression of initial wealth on ini-
tial employment, initial experience, gender, region and age
terms; Standard deviation of initial wealth
11
Parameters describing initial wealth
(see Appendix C)
Notes: In the above descriptions of regressors, \region" is an indicator of the individual residing is west Germany.
\Health" is an indicator of the individual having health problems that limit daily activities. \Gender" is an
indicator of the individual being male. \Education" refers to years of education. \Nationality" is an indicator
of the individual being a native German. \Children" and \marital status" are indicators of, respectively, the
individual having had dependent children prior to entering the sample and having been married prior to entering
the sample. \UI" is an abbreviation for Unemployment Insurance.
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C Initial Conditions
The intertemporal linkages in our model, arising from the public pension and Unemployment In-
surance systems, the endogenous accumulation of experience, and employment state dependent
job opportunities, imply that in-sample wages and employment outcomes depend on the initial
observations of experience, wages, wealth and employment status. Moreover, the presence of
persistent unobservables in wages, in preferences and in the job oer and involuntary separation
probabilities renders the rst observations of experience, wages, wealth and employment status
endogenous with respect to the persistent unobservables that drive subsequent behavior. To
obtain consistent estimates of the structural parameters, despite the endogeneity of the initial
conditions, we proceed in the spirit of Heckman (1981). Specically, we approximate behav-
ior prior to the sample period using a reduced form model in which the pre-sample endogenous
variables may depend on the persistent unobservables that aect behavior during the sample pe-
riod. The parameters appearing in the initial conditions are estimated jointly with the structural
parameters.
When implementing our MSM estimation method, we simulate employment and retirement
outcomes for each individual in each quarter between leaving full-time education and entering
the sample from a multinomial logit model. The payos in the multinomial logit model depend
on observed individual characteristics, the quarter-specic wage, cohort eects, and the perma-
nent unobservables that feature in preferences and in the job oer and involuntary separation
probabilities. When simulating behavior prior to the sample period, quarter-specic wages are
obtained by taking draws from the distribution of oered wages as described by the structural
parameters. Using the simulated pre-sample employment outcomes and wages we are able to
construct each individual's experience, Unemployment Insurance entitlement period and pension
points at the time when the individual enters the sample. Finally, we simulate initial wealth by
drawing from a log normal distribution with a variance 2Wealth and a mean that depends on the
individual's initial experience and initial employment state, as well as on age, gender, education
and region of residence. Note that, via dependencies on pre-sample employment behavior and
wages, the simulated values of initial experience, the initial Unemployment Insurance entitle-
ment period, initial pension points and initial wealth are endogenous with respect to behavior
during the sample period.
Marital status and household structure prior to the individual entering the sample perform
the role of exclusion restrictions, that is variables that aect the initial conditions but which,
conditional on initial behavior, do not aect outcomes during the sample period. Examination
of the relevant moments reveals that the excluded variables jointly have a signicant eect on
initial employment and initial retirement behavior (2 test; p = 0:001). Table 7 presents our
estimates of the parameters appearing in the initial conditions.
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Table 7: Estimates of parameters appearing in the initial conditions
Coecient Standard Error
Initial Employment
Intercept 1.943 0.348
(Age  40)I(40  Age < 55)=15 -2.031 0.399
(Age  55)I(Age  55)=15 -4.990 0.830
log(gross oered wage) 2.605 0.453
Permanent unobserved individual preference shifter 2.717 0.649
Permanent unobserved individual eect appearing in involuntary separation prob. 0.002 0.147
Permanent unobserved individual eect appearing in job oer prob. -2.694 0.349
Male 0.211 1.074
West 0.109 0.693
West  Male 0.100 1.464
Education (years)/10 1.763 0.484
Year of birth  West  Male -0.443 0.534
Year of birth  West  Female 0.215 0.586
Year of birth  East  Male 0.449 1.046
Year of birth  East  Female 0.946 1.230
Native German -0.494 0.359
Previously been marriedy 0.207 1.115
Previously had childreny 0.350 1.273
Previously been married  Westy -0.951 0.965
Previously been married  Maley -0.590 0.725
Previously had children  Westy -0.226 1.255
Initial health problems -1.637 0.383
Initial Retirement
Intercept -3.374 0.267
(Age  54)I(54  Age < 58)=5 0.115 0.621
(Age  58)I(Age  58)=5 2.723 0.367
Male -0.770 0.665
West -1.283 0.408
West  Male 1.192 0.758
Year of birth  West  Male 0.516 0.651
Year of birth  West  Female 1.163 0.480
Year of birth  East  Male -1.949 3.344
Year of birth  East  Female 0.264 0.799
Initial health problems 1.901 0.385
Initial Wealth
Intercept 7.375 0.135
(Age  40)I(40  Age < 55)=10 0.969 0.168
(Age  55)I(55  Age < 60)=5 0.353 0.180
(Age  60)I(Age  60)=5 0.315 0.210
Male -0.161 0.237
West 1.156 0.155
West  Male 0.376 0.268
Education (years)/10 1.096 0.142
Initial experience 0.110 0.210
Initially employed 0.432 0.121
Wealth 1.169 0.033
Notes: y denotes an exclusion restriction. The exclusion restrictions in the initial employment equation are
jointly signicant (2 test; p = 0:010). \Initial health problems" is an indicator of an individual having health
problems that limit daily activities in the initial period of observation.
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D Model Fit
Figure 4: Fit of observed life-cycle behavior
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Notes: \Observed" refers to a value observed in the sample while \Fitted" refers to the value of the applicable
quantity averaged over 5 simulated data sets.
Table 8: Fit of log wages and changes in log wages
P20(w
) P40(w) P60(w) P80(w) P20(1w) P40(1w) P60(1w) P80(1w)
Fitted -0.011 0.201 0.388 0.607 -0.076 -0.016 0.022 0.082
Observed -0.034 0.194 0.394 0.650 -0.080 -0.016 0.020 0.098
SE 0.020 0.016 0.017 0.026 0.005 0.001 0.002 0.006
t-value 1.162 0.411 -0.356 -1.627 0.845 0.034 1.069 -2.446
P20(
2w) P40(2w) P60(2w) P80(2w) P20(3w) P40(3w) P60(3w) P80(3w)
Fitted -0.096 -0.018 0.033 0.107 -0.101 -0.019 0.041 0.122
Observed -0.087 -0.017 0.034 0.121 -0.084 -0.008 0.053 0.134
SE 0.006 0.003 0.003 0.009 0.008 0.005 0.005 0.009
t-value -1.399 -0.212 -0.531 -1.497 -2.174 -1.960 -2.217 -1.361
Notes: Pj(w
) refers to the jth percentile of log wages and Pj(rw) denotes the jth percentile of the rth
annual dierence in log wages. \Observed" refers to a value observed in the sample while \Fitted" refers to
the value of the applicable quantity averaged over 5 simulated data sets. \SE" is the standard error of the
observed quantity (obtained via bootstrapping with clustering at the individual level) and \t-value" is the
t-value for the test of equality of the observed and tted quantities.
E Tax and Transfer Systems
E.1 Net Income if Employed
An employed individual receives a gross income equal to the total value of gross wage income
and interest income from wealth, with the latter being equal to the real interest rate times the
value of the individual's stock of wealth. The net income received by an employed individual
aged t, mi;f;t, is computed by applying to gross income the appropriate deductions for Social
Security Contributions and income tax.
Social Security Contributions are made for health, pension and Unemployment Insurance
benets and are obligatory. Social Security Contributions are payable at a constant rate on all
30
gross wage income above a disregard and below an earnings cap. Social Security Contributions
are not payable on any gross wage income in excess of the earnings cap. In addition to the
employee's Social Security Contributions, the employer pays the same amount in Social Security
Contributions.31 Income tax is payable on the entirety of an individual's taxable income. Tax-
able income, in turn, consists of any gross income in excess of the sum of the universal tax-free
allowance and permissable Social Security Contributions.32 Income tax is payable at a rate that
is increasing in the individual's taxable income.33 Table 9 summarizes some key features of tax
and transfer systems.
Table 9: Selected features of the German tax and transfer systems: 1991 - 2007
Social Security Contributions Income tax Social Assistance
Contribution Max. Cont. Max. Cont. Tax free Top marginal Solidarity Average Average
Year rate west east allowance tax rate tax west east
(%) per month per month per year (%) (%) per month per month
1991 17.7 3250 1700 4050 53 3.3 550 500
1992 18.4 3400 2400 4050 53 3.75 540 520
1993 18.6 3600 2650 4050 53 0 550 544
1994 19.4 3800 2950 4050 53 0 557 545
1995 19.6 3900 3200 4050 53 7.5 564 553
1996 20.1 4000 3400 6021 53 7.5 571 560.5
1997 21.0 4100 3550 6021 53 7.5 580 569.5
1998 21.1 4200 3500 6156 53 5.5 586 575
1999 21.1 4250 3600 6507 53 5.5 594 584
2000 20.5 4300 3550 6876 51 5.5 606 596
2001 20.4 4350 3650 7200 48.5 5.5 617 606
2002 20.6 4500 3750 7200 48.5 5.5 629 617
2003 21.0 5100 4250 7200 48.5 5.5 634 622
2004 21.0 5150 4350 7632 45 5.5 643 631
2005 20.7 5200 4400 7632 42 5.5 653 637
2006 21.0 5250 4400 7632 42 5.5 658 642
2007 20.3 5250 4550 7632 45 5.5 662 645
Notes: Unless indicated otherwise, all gures are in Euros and are expressed in nominal terms. Social
Assistance consists of a person-related component that varies by region of residence and individual-specic
housing benets. Housing benets are limited to the cost of a reasonable apartment, given local property
prices and household size.
E.2 Net Income if Unemployed
An unemployed individual receives a gross income equal to the value of interest income from
wealth. The net income received by an unemployed individual aged t, mi;u;t, is computed by
adding to gross income any transfer payments from the Government and applying the appropri-
ate deduction for income tax. Government-provided transfers to unemployed individuals take
two forms: Means-tested Social Assistance benets which ensure a universal minimum income,
irrespective of the individual's employment or earnings history; and Unemployment Insurance
31Since July 2005 there has been a small divergence from this rule which we neglect in this study.
32The value of Social Security Contributions that can be set against gross income when computing taxable
income is subject to a maximum limit.
33We note here two further features of income tax that apply irrespective of an individual's labor market status.
First, only interest income from wealth in excess of a disregard counts towards taxable income. Second, there
exists a Solidarity tax which was introduced to nance the cost of German reunication. The Solidarity tax is
proportional to an individual's income tax liability. Currently, there is no indication that the Solidarity tax will
be phased out.
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benets which provide an unemployed individual with a fraction of his or her previous net earn-
ings. Social Assistance benets are paid indenitely while Unemployment Insurance benets are
paid for an entitlement period which is determined by an individual's age and recent employ-
ment history. Social Assistance benets have no tax implications. Unemployment Insurance
benets are not directly taxed. Instead, Unemployment Insurance benets are added to interest
income and the individual's average tax rate is determined based on the same tax schedule as
applicable to employed individuals. The individual's tax liability is determined by applying
the individual-specic average tax rate to interest income. Table 10 provides further details
concerning the Unemployment Insurance system.
Table 10: Maximum Unemployment Insurance entitlement period by age: 1991 - 2007
Age (years) Prior to April 1997 From April 1997 until Jan 2006 Since February 2006
< 42 12 12 12
42{43 18 12 12
44 22 12 12
45{46 22 18 12
47{48 22 22 12
49{51 26 22 12
52{53 26 26 12
54 32 26 12
55{56 32 26 18
 57 32 32 18
Notes: Adapted from Schmitz and Steiner (2007). Individuals accumulate entitlement to Unem-
ployment Insurance benets at a rate of one month of Unemployment Insurance entitlement for
every two months of employment, up to the relevant age-specic maximum detailed in this table.
For the duration of the entitlement period, Unemployment Insurance benets provide an income of
up to 60% of an individual's net income in his or her most recent job.
F Public Pension System: Further Details
F.1 Accumulation of Pension Points
In addition to the pension point accumulation methods detailed in Section 2.4, individuals
may be awarded further pension points in recognition of child-rearing. Specically, one parent,
normally the mother, is credited with one pension point for each child born before 1992 and three
pension points for each child born more recently. Although we restrict our sample to men and
women who are currently living without dependent children, it is possible that members of our
sample previously cared for children. Reecting the possibilities for individuals to gain pension
points for child-rearing, in the empirical implementation of the model we credit all women
who had at least one child prior to entering the sample with 3 additional pension points. The
German legislation further species that individuals may be awarded additional pension points
for vocational training, university education, military or community service and provision of
care for relatives. We neglect these additional pension points in our analysis.
F.2 Pension Point Values
Table 11 shows the proportionality factors used to compute the value of the non-reduced public
pension. This table also shows the adjustment factor applied the wages of east Germans prior
to determining the pension point weight.
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Table 11: Pension point values (proportionality factors): 1991 - 2007
Year
Point value in Euros
Adjustment factor for east Germany
West Germany East Germany
1991 20.74 (25.32) 13.59 (15.78) 1.37
1992 21.80 (25.32) 13.59 (15.78) 1.44
1993 22.75 (25.31) 16.45 (18.30) 1.32
1994 23.52 (25.48) 17.63 (19.10) 1.27
1995 23.64 (25.16) 18.58 (19.79) 1.23
1996 23.86 (25.04) 19.62 (20.59) 1.22
1997 24.26 (24.76) 20.71 (21.33) 1.21
1998 24.36 (24.71) 20.90 (21.33) 1.21
1999 24.69 (24.69) 21.48 (21.78) 1.21
2000 24.84 (24.35) 21.61 (21.61) 1.20
2001 25.31 (24.48) 22.06 (21.63) 1.20
2002 25.86 (24.75) 22.70 (21.95) 1.20
2003 26.13 (24.60) 22.97 (21.98) 1.19
2004 26.13 (24.13) 22.97 (21.63) 1.19
2005 26.13 (23.75) 22.97 (21.21) 1.18
2006 26.13 (23.75) 22.97 (20.88) 1.18
2007 26.27 (23.33) 23.09 (20.51) 1.18
Notes: Non-parenthesized gures are nominal and gures in parentheses have been
converted into year 2000 prices using the Retail Price Index.
F.3 Eligibility for Early Retirement and Adjustments to Public Pension Ben-
ets for Early Retirees
As noted in Section 2.4, the eligibility criteria for early retirement depend on gender, disability
status, working history and age. We provide here further details regarding the eligibility criteria
for early retirement. In addition, we describe the year-specic rules that dene the value of
public pension benets received by early retirees. We reiterate that all of these details are fully
incorporated into our implementation of the above described structural life-cycle model.
Individuals aged under 60 years who are able to demonstrate suciently poor health can
receive a disability pension. The value of the disability pension is proportional to the cumulative
value of the weighted pension points that the individual would have received if he or she had
remained in employment until age 60 years, with the proportionality factor being the same
as that used to determine the value of public pension benets for individuals retiring at the
full pensionable age. Additionally, individuals aged over 60 years who are able to demonstrate
suciently poor health can take early retirement and thus claim public pension benets. Prior
to 2002, such individuals received a \non-reduced public pension", the value of which is obtained
by multiplying the individual's weighted pension points accumulated at the time of retirement
by the same proportionality factor as used to determine the value of public pension benets for
individuals retiring at the full pensionable age. More recently, the non-reduced public pension
has only been available to individuals with suciently poor heath aged 63 years or over at the
date of retirement. Meanwhile, those entering early retirement between the ages of 60 and 63
years due to poor health have received a reduced public pension. The value of the reduced public
pension is obtained by applying a penalty to the non-reduced pension of 3.6% for every year
that the individual's age upon retirement is below the full pensionable age of 65 years. This
adjustment is less than actuarially fair.
In addition, prior to 1999, women aged 60 years and above and men with suciently long
service histories (dened as at least 35 years of work experience) aged 63 years or over at the date
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of retirement were able to retire and receive a non-reduced public pension. Legislative reforms
in 1992 and 1999 increased the age requirement for retirement on a non-reduced public pension
to 65 years for healthy men and women, and also introduced the right to early retirement from
age 60 years on a reduced public pension for individuals with long service histories. The value of
the reduced public pension is obtained by applying a penalty of 3.6% to the non-reduced pension
for every year that the individual's age upon retirement is below the full pensionable age of 65
years. The phase-in period for the 1992 legislation commenced in 1997 and the combined 1992
and 1999 reforms will be fully eective by 2017. See Bonin (2009) for further details.
F.4 Expectations Concerning the Future Public Pension System
As explained in footnote 10, we assume that individuals expect the cohort-specic rules that
dene the public pension system will be maintained. We describe here the public pension
reforms that occurred during the sample period and we argue that our modeling approach does
not neglect any important anticipated future changes in the public pension system.
Recent pension reforms have the potential to alter the generosity of future public pension
benets. Specically, recent reforms have: (i) increased the full pensionable age from 65 to 67
years; (ii) changed the eligibility requirements for early retirement and reduced the generosity
of the public pension for some groups of early retirees; and (iii) changed the value of the pro-
portionality factor, via the introduction of a \sustainability factor". The increase in the full
pensionable age aected only a handful of the sampled individuals and only in the second half
of 2007. Thus, we assume reasonably a full pensionable age of 65 years for all sample members.
Regarding the treatment of those who wish to retire early, we note that reforms to either the
rules governing eligibility for early retirement or the adjustments made to the value of public
pension benets received by early retirees have always been announced many years in advance
of implementation. Therefore, these changes did not aect the pension system applicable to
individuals aged over 40 years at the time of announcement. It is therefore entirely realistic for
us to assume that the sample members, who are all aged 40 years or above, expect that the
rules applicable to their particular birth cohort will persist.
Finally, the sustainability factor, introduced in 2005, constitutes an adjustment to the pro-
portionality factor and is designed to allow the public pension system to accommodate demo-
graphic changes and business cycle eects. Specically, the sustainability factor depends on the
ratio of the earnings of working individuals to the number of retired individuals, and acts to
reduce the generosity of public pension benets if this ratio decreases. It is anticipated that in
the long-run the sustainability factor will work to reduce the value of public pension benets.
However, the short-run eects of the sustainability factor are unclear. Indeed, via the sustain-
ability factor, a recent rise in female labor force participation caused an increase in the value
of public pension benets. We therefore consider it unlikely that the introduction of the sus-
tainability factor will thus far have aected strongly individuals' expectations concerning future
public pension benets. Moreover, the sustainability factor was introduced in 2005, which is
towards the end of our sample period. For these reasons, we neglect the sustainability factor in
our analysis.
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